

Moving beyond tax reform

2019 Tax policy outlook

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The heart of the matter

The 2018 midterm elections and a partial government shutdown demonstrate that sharp differences between the two major political parties that were evident during the 2016 presidential election continue to dominate political debate. A key challenge facing the new 116th Congress and President Donald Trump, in the remaining two years of his term, will be whether bipartisan agreements can be reached to enact significant legislation with a Democratic-controlled House and a Republican-led Senate.

That challenge will be intensified by ongoing disagreements between the political parties on how to address many issues, including tax policy, trade policy, healthcare, immigration, and the environment. In addition, the 2020 presidential election already is expected to have an effect on tax legislation this year, with President Trump preparing to run for re-election and with several Democrats in Congress exploring a run for president, along with others, who are highlighting tax policy as a future campaign issue.

Overview

The new 116th Congress began on January 3 with President Trump and Congress needing to reach an agreement to end a partial government shutdown affecting fiscal year (FY) 2019 funding for several departments and agencies, including the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The longest-running partial government shutdown in US history began at midnight on December 21, 2018, when an earlier temporary funding measure expired without President Trump and Democratic leaders in Congress reaching an agreement over the level of border security funding and whether those funds could be used to construct physical barriers at the US-Mexico border.

Disagreements over immigration and many other issues may affect legislative action to fund all departments and agencies for FY 2020, which begins on October 1, 2019. President Trump is expected to include spending cuts in his FY 2020 budget proposals, which by law are due to be submitted to Congress by the first Monday in February (February 4, 2019), although presidents often miss this statutory deadline. President Trump last October called on department and agency leaders to offer proposals to cut their current budgets by 5%, but he indicated that some exceptions could be provided for defense and certain other programs. Congress also by law is scheduled to complete action by April 15, 2019 on a budget resolution setting spending levels for FY 2020. This budget deadline is non-binding; the previous Congress did not complete an FY 2019 budget.

An additional key fiscal policy debate will begin formally this year after March 1, 2019, when a temporary suspension of the statutory federal debt limit will expire. While the Treasury Department can use 'extraordinary measures' to postpone the need for an increase in the statutory debt limit until later in the year, debate over this issue could focus attention on projected high federal budget deficits and both tax and spending policies.

Note: At the beginning of the new Congress, House Democrats approved changes to the Rules of the House that include reinstating a modified version of the 'Gephardt rule' (named after former House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO)) that would allow the House to pass a free-standing measure suspending the debt limit as part of the process of voting to approve a budget resolution. Any debt limit measure approved by the House under this procedure still would need 60 votes to pass the Republican-led Senate, and would have to be signed into law by President Trump.

Divided government

Efforts to reach bipartisan agreements on legislation this year will face challenges as House Democrats under Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) begin a number of investigations into actions by President Trump and his administration. Such efforts also will be affected by the ongoing investigation by Special Counsel Robert Mueller into Russian interference in the 2016 elections and related matters. In addition, the Senate, led by Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY), is expected to devote a significant amount of time to considering nominations to fill judicial and executive branch positions, including several open cabinet positions. Unlike most legislation, a simple majority vote is required for Senate confirmation.

The prospects for significant tax legislation being enacted in 2019 by a Democratic-controlled House and Republican-led Senate will be affected by continuing partisan divisions over the 2017 tax reform act, which was enacted with only Republican support. While Democrats in Congress may propose to revise some tax reform provisions, divided government means that dramatic changes to the 2017 tax legislation are unlikely. Opportunities for tax legislation could arise, however, on specific issues that could be the subject of negotiations between President Trump and Democratic and Republican Congressional leaders.

Both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee have new leadership for the 116th Congress. The Ways and Means Committee is chaired by Rep. Richard Neal (D-MA), and the Finance Committee is led by Senator Charles ('Chuck') Grassley (R-IA).

The House Ways and Means Committee will begin to hold a series of oversight hearings early this year on the 2017 tax reform act. Chairman Neal recently stated that securing sufficient funding for infrastructure and promoting the availability of workplace retirement plans are among his top priorities this Congress. Meanwhile, Chairman Neal has indicated that he will seek to obtain President Trump's tax returns, possibly using a 1924 law that authorizes the House and Senate tax committees to examine taxpayers' returns.

Senate Finance Chairman Grassley has stated that he welcomes 'legitimate efforts to perfect' the 2017 act, but he will offer 'stiff resistance' to efforts to increase taxes or undo reforms intended to make the United States more competitive globally. He also has said that he will pursue legislative action to make permanent individual provisions, including the 20% pass-through business deduction, that are scheduled to sunset after 2025. At the same time, Chairman Grassley has expressed hope that Democrats will join him in his own oversight efforts to 'hold the IRS accountable to taxpayers, ensure the nonprofit sector is living up to the purpose of its tax-exempt status, stand up for tax whistleblowers who expose tax cheats, and track down, expose, and address tax shelters.'

President Trump may include some new tax proposals in his FY 2020 budget, but he currently is not expected to follow through on the idea, offered during the final weeks of the 2018 midterm election season, to provide an additional 10% 'middle-class' tax cut in his budget. President Trump said that steps would be taken to make this new individual tax cut 'net neutral' to avoid adding to federal budget deficits, but Administration officials did not provide any details on who would qualify for the tax cut or whether its cost would be offset with other tax increases or with reductions in federal spending.

Observation: In initial public comments on his 10% tax cut idea, President Trump stated that he might consider accepting income tax rate increases for corporations or upper-income individuals as part of an agreement to gain Congressional Democratic support. While Congressional Republicans leaders expressed opposition to the idea, President Trump's suggestion highlights the fact that revenue-raising proposals are unlikely to be enacted this year without his strong support since Senate Republicans otherwise would not consider any tax increases approved by House Democrats.

The House and Senate tax committees will be considering many other tax issues that were left unresolved at the end of the last Congress, including proposed technical corrections to the 2017 tax reform act, and a large number of expired or expiring tax provisions (also known as 'tax extenders'). Additional tax issues that may be addressed this year include enhanced retirement security proposals, IRS tax administration legislation, and disaster relief tax provisions.

Healthcare and the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) were key issues in the 2018 midterm elections, with many candidates focusing on the potential effects of legal challenges to the ACA on consumer protections, such as prohibitions against denial of coverage for pre-existing conditions. With Democrats having won control of the House, Senate Majority Leader McConnell commented shortly after the elections that the Senate was unlikely to vote on new legislation to 'repeal and replace' the 2010 healthcare reform law. As a result, it appeared for a time that the focus of ACA legislation might be limited to ongoing efforts to delay or repeal specific ACA tax provisions, such as the medical device tax or the so-called 'Cadillac' excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health plans.

Hopes by some that the ACA might fade as a political issue in 2019 were dashed by a December 14, 2018, court decision issued by Judge Reed O'Connor of the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas, in which he ruled that changes to the ACA that were enacted as part of the 2017 tax reform act had the effect of making the entirety of the 2010 law unconstitutional. While the Administration has noted that the ACA remains in effect pending judicial review of Judge O'Connor's ruling, the uncertainty surrounding his ruling further increases the likelihood that President Trump and a divided Congress will continue to debate the ACA and the future of US healthcare policy in advance of the 2020 elections.

Strong economic outlook amid increasing uncertainties


Many economists agree that the 2017 tax reform act generally has served to bolster the current long-running cycle of economic growth that has been underway since the end of the 2007-2009 'great recession.' The government's most recent economic reports show third-quarter GDP growth at 3.4% and the unemployment rate at 3.9% in December. Employers added 312,000 jobs in December 2018, exceeding the average of 208,000 monthly jobs added over the prior 12 months.

Third-quarter growth continued to be boosted by strong consumer spending. Business fixed investment grew at 2.5% in the quarter after growing strongly in the first half of the year. Real business investment was up 6.8% year-over-year in the quarter. The US consumer confidence index also hit an 18-year high in late 2018, although this index has fallen slightly in recent weeks during a period marked by increased market volatility and a partial government shutdown.

The strong growth experienced in 2018 is expected by most economists to taper by 2020 as the fiscal stimulus of the tax cuts and federal spending boost from last year's two-year budget agreement diminish. As shown in Figure 1, the most recent Blue Chip forecast estimated real GDP growth to be 2.9% in 2018, 2.6% in 2019, but only 1.9% in 2020. Similarly, the Federal Reserve's most recent median forecast is for real GDP growth of 2.3% in 2019, declining to 2.0% in 2020, and 1.8% in 2021.



Figure 1: Real gross domestic product



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Dec. 21, 2018, and Blue Chip Economic Indicators, Jan. 10, 2019.

In projections released in November 2018, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) forecast world economic growth decelerating in 2019 and 2020 due to less accommodative monetary and fiscal policy, as well as increasing trade tensions.

Uncertainties relating to trade disputes are a downside risk to world economic growth. Some officials have expressed concern that US-China trade tensions could be contributing to reduced rates of economic growth in China, the world's second largest economy in terms of nominal GDP. On December 1, 2018, President Trump met with China's President Xi Jinping to attempt to de-escalate the reciprocal tariffs the two countries had placed on each other's strategic industries. According to a White House readout of the meeting, the United States agreed not to increase the 'List III' tariffs on \$200 billion worth of Chinese product from 10% to 25%, as had been scheduled to go into effect, for a period of 90 days (that is, until March 1, 2019) while other negotiations continue.

There also is some uncertainty about the prospects for Congress ratifying the recently negotiated replacement for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). President Trump will need bipartisan support to win House and Senate approval for the USMCA. President Trump has suggested that he might withdraw the United States from NAFTA to put pressure on Congress to approve the new USMCA. It should be noted that given the lack of precedent for such a move, there remains some question as to whether a president can withdraw unilaterally from a Congressionally approved trade agreement.

Political developments in Europe provide another point of economic uncertainty, including recent demonstrations in France against government tax policy decisions, changes in Germany's political leadership, and budget issues in Italy. Of particular concern for business planning is the United Kingdom's scheduled departure from the European Union on March 29, 2019, which could have radically different impacts depending on whether a comprehensive withdrawal agreement can be approved or a 'hard Brexit' takes place.

Business taxpayers also will be focused on ongoing efforts by the EU and its member countries to take a more active role in tax policy to implement—and in some cases go beyond—the OECD's base erosion and profits shifting (BEPS) recommendations. EU Member States over the last two years have reached agreements to implement the BEPS minimum standards, as well as controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules, exit taxes, and extensive new transaction reporting requirements. More recent developments include ongoing attempts to seek agreement on short-term and long-term measures to tax digital activities, as well as continuing State aid investigations by the European Commission.



An in-depth discussion

Balance of power

Following the November 6, 2018 midterm elections, Democrats secured a net gain of at least 40 seats to win control of the US House of Representatives in the 116th Congress, while Republicans increased their majority in the US Senate by two seats. Former Speaker Pelosi has been elected to serve again as Speaker of the House. Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) will serve as House Minority Leader, with former Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI) having retired. Senator McConnell continues to serve as Senate Majority Leader, and Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) remains Senate Minority Leader.

Observation: Speaker Pelosi secured the votes to win the Speaker's race in part by agreeing to schedule a Democratic Caucus vote in mid-February to consider term limits for senior House Democratic leadership positions. She has indicated that she plans to abide by the proposed term limits (i.e., step down from her leadership position after 2022) regardless of the results of the Democratic Caucus vote.




In the House of Representatives, the First Session of the 116th Congress begins with 235 Democrats and 199 Republicans. One House race remains undecided; the North Carolina Board of Elections last year voted to delay certifying election results in that state's 9th Congressional district following allegations of election fraud by a consultant to winning Republican candidate Mark Harris. North Carolina officials are considering whether a new election should be held for that seat.

In the Senate, there are 53 Republicans and 47 Democrats (including the two Independents who caucus with Senate Democrats). Senate procedures in effect generally require 60 votes to limit debate on legislation and to reach a vote on final passage. A Senate rule modification adopted in 2017 lowers the threshold for approving Supreme Court nominations to a simple majority (usually 51 votes), which brings the requirement in line with a 2013 rule change that adopted a simple majority threshold for executive branch and non-Supreme Court judicial nominations.

The President has the power to veto legislation passed by Congress, with a two-thirds majority of both the House and Senate required for a veto override. With Republican majorities in both the House and the Senate in the last Congress, President Trump did not veto any bills during his first two years in office. While Democrats now control the House, President Trump is not expected to use his presidential veto often, since Senate Republicans generally would not take up House-passed legislation that is opposed by the president.

Figure 2: 2018 Midterm election results



House and Senate tax committees

Rep. Neal is the new Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, having served as the Ranking Democratic Member on the committee in the last Congress. Former Chairman Kevin Brady (R-TX) will assume the role of Ranking Republican Member. There are 25 Democrats and 17 Republicans on the committee, including 11 new Democratic members—Reps. Gwen Moore (WI), Dan Kildee (MI), Brendan Boyle (PA), Don Beyer (VA), Dwight Evans (PA), Brad Schneider (IL), Tom Suozzi (NY), Jimmy Panetta (CA), Stephanie Murphy (FL), Steven Horsford (NV), and Jimmy Gomez (CA)—and three new Republican members—Reps. Jodey Arrington (TX), Drew Ferguson (GA), and Ron Estes (KS).

The Senate Finance Committee will be led by Senator Grassley following the retirement of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) at the end of 2018. Senator Grassley is term-limited under Senate Republican Conference rules and cannot continue as chairman or ranking member in a future Congress (that is, after 2020) due to the number of years he previously held those positions. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) remains the Ranking Democratic Member. The Finance Committee is composed of 15 Republicans and 13 Democrats, including three new Republican members, Senators James Lankford (OK), Steve Daines (MT), and Todd Young (IN), and two new Democratic members, Senators Maggie Hassan (NH) and Catherine Cortez Masto (NV).

A listing of House and Senate tax committee members and other tax policymakers is provided in Appendix A.

Looking ahead to the 2020 elections

All 435 seats in the House are up for election every two years. Republicans would need to achieve a net gain of approximately 18 seats in 2020 to regain control of the House, assuming they hold the undecided race for North Carolina’s 9th Congressional district.

Roughly one-third of all Senate seats are subject to election every two years. Democrats would need a net gain of four seats in the 2020 elections to win a 51-seat majority in the Senate (three seats if a Democrat is elected Vice President and would be able to break tie-votes, in a 50-50 Senate). Republicans would need a net gain of seven seats to achieve a filibuster-proof 60-seat majority.

In 2020, 34 Senate seats are up for re-election, with 22 currently held by Republicans and 12 currently held by Democrats. The Senate map for the 2020 elections is much more favorable to Democrats than it was for the 2018 midterm elections, when 10 Democrats ran in states that had been won by President Trump.

Note: Under Arizona law, a special election will be held in 2020 to fill the Senate seat once held by the late Senator John McCain (R). This seat was filled temporarily last year by former Senator Jon Kyl (R), who resigned at the end of the 115th Congress. The seat was subsequently filled by former Rep. Martha McSally (R), who last year lost her race against then Rep. Kyrsten Sinema (D) to fill the seat of retiring Republican Arizona Senator Jeff Flake.

At this writing, Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) and Senate Finance Committee member Pat Roberts (R-KS) are the only Senators who have announced plans not to run for re-election in 2020. Senate Finance Committee members currently expected to run for re-election are Michael Enzi (R-WY), John Cornyn (R-TX), Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Steve Daines (R-MT), and Mark Warner (D-VA). A listing of all Senators whose seats are subject to election in 2020 is included in Appendix B.

Figure 3: Congressional legislative schedule

House and Senate convene	January 3
Martin Luther King Jr. Day recess (House, Senate)	January 21 - 25
President’s State of the Union Address	January 29
Presidents Day recess (House, Senate)	February 18 - 22
House and Senate recess	March 18 - 22
Spring recess (House, Senate)	April 15 - 26
Memorial Day recess (House, Senate)	May 27 - 31
Independence Day recess (House, Senate)	July 1 - 5
August recess (House)	July 29 - September 6
August recess (Senate)	August 5 - September 6
House and Senate recess	September 30 – October 14
Columbus Day	October 14
House recess	November 1 - 11
Veterans Day	November 11
Thanksgiving recess (House, Senate)	November 25 – 29
Target adjournment date (House)	December 12
Target adjournment date (Senate)	December 13

US tax policy

Ongoing debate over the 2017 tax reform act


Competitiveness of US system

The US tax reforms enacted in late 2017 contained key elements intended to promote stronger economic growth, including individual tax cuts, a globally competitive corporate tax rate with incentives for capital investment, and a movement toward a territorial system of international taxation with anti-base erosion measures, accompanied by the unlocking of foreign cash with a mandatory 'deemed repatriation' of unrepatriated foreign profits. The 2017 legislation provided a net \$1.5 trillion tax cut over the 2018-2027 budget period.

In recent years, a general bipartisan consensus developed that the US corporate tax rate needed to be lowered to a more competitive level in line with other major economies. While some Democrats oppose any corporate rate reduction, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Neal previously expressed support for a corporate rate reduction that would be fiscally responsible, and Senate Finance Ranking Member Wyden prior to the 2017 act introduced comprehensive tax reform legislation that would have lowered the corporate income tax rate to 24% (albeit with current taxation of a US firm's worldwide income without benefit of deferral).

As shown in Figure 4, the 2017 tax reform act moved the US combined (federal and state) corporate tax rate closer to the OECD average combined rate.


Figure 4: US combined (federal and state) corporate rate compared to other OECD nations



Source: OECD Tax Database

One challenge facing US policymakers in maintaining the competitiveness of the US tax system is that several OECD nations, including major G-7 countries like France and the United Kingdom, have enacted or have proposed corporate income tax rate reductions, as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Enacted and proposed OECD corporate rate changes



* Proposed but not enacted rate reduction shown for Switzerland (combined rate for Zurich).

All OECD countries other than the United States also impose some form of federal-level value-added tax (VAT). The United States relies on both individual and corporate income taxes far more than other OECD nations.

While both major US political parties generally have opposed proposals to establish a federal-level consumption tax, some individual members of Congress have proposed legislation that would use a VAT to lower individual and corporate income tax rates. For example, Senate Finance Committee member Ben Cardin (D-MD) has proposed a ‘progressive consumption tax’ bill that would eliminate the income tax for most US households and lower the US corporate income tax rate to 17%.

Observation: Most economists generally agree that income taxes have a more negative effect on economic growth and productivity than consumption taxes like a VAT.

Tax reform oversight

The full Ways and Means Committee is expected to hold numerous hearings on the 2017 tax reform act to examine the effects of the Act’s provisions on economic growth, wage growth, employment, and business investment within the United States and globally. Additional Ways and Means subcommittee hearings are expected on specific tax reform provisions, with a number of Congressional Democrats expressing a particular interest in examining certain international tax provisions and whether the Act’s anti-base erosion measures, such as the ‘global intangible low-taxed income’ (GILTI) and the ‘base erosion and anti-avoidance tax’ (BEAT) provisions, are sufficient.

Observation: Chairman Neal has made a point of the fact that hearings were not held on the 2017 tax reform statutory proposals in the weeks between the initial introduction of ‘HR 1, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’ by then Chairman Brady on November 2, 2017, and President Trump’s signing of the final legislation on December 22, 2017.

Some Ways and Means Democrats have expressed a particular interest in reviewing the effect of the 2017 Act's \$10,000 cap on federal deductions for state and local taxes on individuals as well as on states and local communities. Repealing or modifying the cap likely would have a significant revenue cost and, if done as a stand-alone measure, would provide the greatest relief to higher-income taxpayers. Proposals along these lines also could have implications for the reformed alternative minimum tax (AMT).

The Senate Finance Committee also is expected to hold oversight hearings on the 2017 tax reform act, with a particular focus on how the IRS is administering the first filing season under the new law and recent Treasury and IRS guidance affecting individuals and business.

Tax guidance

Treasury and the IRS by the end of last year issued more than 1,500 pages of proposed regulatory guidance on key tax reform provisions, and will continue to issue additional guidance this year. Treasury officials have indicated that they hope to finalize as much guidance as possible by June 22, 2019, which is 18 months after the original date of enactment. Under current law (Section 7805(b)(2)), regulations filed or issued within 18 months of the date a statute is enacted can be made retroactive to the original date of enactment. For a listing of select tax reform guidance projects, see Appendix C.

Observation: Ways and Means oversight hearings on the 2017 Act's provisions could affect ongoing Treasury and IRS consideration of public comments on proposed regulations as efforts continue to finalize guidance projects.

Tax reform technical corrections

While significant changes to the 2017 Act seem unlikely this year, the House and Senate tax committees are expected to consider 'technical corrections' to clarify the intent of certain tax reform provisions and to correct specific statutory drafting errors. In a 457-page 'Bluebook' summarizing the 2017 Act, JCT staff late last year identified more than 70 provisions that may require technical corrections.

Note: Technical corrections generally are effective retroactively, as if included in the original statute, and generally are considered to have no revenue effect.

Democrats in the House and Senate have indicated a willingness to consider technical corrections to the 2017 tax reform act, but they also have indicated that such action would have to be paired with action on tax issues of concern to Democrats that were not addressed by Republicans in 2017. For example, Congress reached a bipartisan agreement in early 2018 to enact a so-called 'grain glitch' correction—addressing how the operation of the 20% deduction for pass-through business income affects certain parts of the agriculture sector—by also extending and expanding the low-income housing tax credit.

Ways and Means Chairman Neal has expressed a willingness to act early this year to address certain tax issues that are

considered 'time-sensitive,' but he has indicated generally that hearings will be needed to consider tax reform technical corrections before legislative action is taken.

In the recent 'lame-duck' session of the last Congress, then Ways and Means Chairman Brady proposed corrections to six specific tax reform provisions as part of a year-end tax package that was approved by the House, but no action was taken by the Senate. On January 2, 2019, the last day of the previous Congress, then Chairman Brady also released a 90-page discussion draft proposing additional technical corrections and other modifications to the 2017 tax reform act.

The tax reform technical corrections approved by the House last year were:

- **Excess 'toll charge' remittance.** Section 965(h) would be amended to provide that an excess remittance of an installment payment of the repatriation tax would be treated as an overpayment of tax and would not have to be applied to any remaining installments.
- **Controlled foreign corporations.** Section 958(b) would be amended to clarify the application of 'downward' attribution rules under Subpart F CFC provisions.
- **Qualified improvement property.** An amendment to Section 168(e)(3)(E) would specify that the cost recovery period for qualified improvement property is 15 years under the modified accelerated cost recovery system and 20 years under the alternative depreciation system.
- **Net operating loss (NOL) effective date.** The statute would be amended to provide that the modification to carryovers and carrybacks of NOLs applies to NOLs arising in tax years beginning after December 31, 2017.
- **Settlement fees.** Section 162(q)(2) would be amended to provide that the non-deductibility of attorneys' fees involved in nondisclosure agreements relating to a claim of sexual harassment or sexual abuse applies to defendants' costs and not to plaintiffs' costs.
- **Qualified real estate investment trust (REIT) dividends.** Section 852(b) would be amended to provide that in the case of an individual shareholder of a regulated investment company (RIC or mutual fund) that owns stock in a REIT or interests in a publicly traded partnership, the individual is treated as receiving qualified REIT dividends or qualified publicly traded partnership income to the extent any dividends received by the individual from the RIC are attributable to qualified REIT dividends or qualified publicly traded partnership income.



In a letter last year to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Senate Finance Committee Republicans identified three tax reform provisions that warranted technical corrections or regulatory relief. The three provisions noted in the letter were among the issues identified by then Chairman Brady: (1) qualified improvement property, (2) NOL effective date, and (3) settlement fees. Separately, a group of Senate Democrats last year called for action to correct the qualified improvement property provision in the Act, pointing out that it is having a negative effect on retailers and certain other businesses that make ‘leasehold’ improvements.

Congress also could consider additional technical corrections to other tax legislation enacted in recent years. For example, then Chairman Brady last year as part of his year-end tax legislation also proposed technical corrections to certain tax provisions affecting the eligibility of veterans to benefit from federal housing tax credit programs. In addition, House and Senate Democrats have indicated that they may seek to enact technical corrections to certain ACA tax provisions.

The future of the 2017 tax reform act

The 2017 tax reform act sunsetted nearly all the individual tax provisions after 2025. Sunsetting provisions were needed to comply with a Senate budget reconciliation rule that requires 60 votes to overcome a procedural point of order against any legislation increasing federal deficits outside the budget window (in this case, beyond 10 years). As a result, Congress was able to approve the 2017 Act with only Republican votes in the Senate.

House and Senate Republicans also had to adjust various business provisions to keep the overall cost of the 2017 legislation below the net \$1.5 trillion revenue loss limit established by the GOP budget resolution reconciliation instructions for the FY 2017-2027 budget period. Failure to abide by this requirement would have put at risk the bill’s reconciliation protection against a 60-vote point of order. This explains why, for example, full expensing is set to begin

phasing out after 2022, five-year amortization of research expenses is set to begin in 2022, and tighter Section 163(j) interest limitations (EBITDA vs EBIT definition of taxable income) are scheduled to take effect in 2022. In addition, a number of international tax provisions are set to become more restrictive and raise additional revenue after 2026.

Observation: The budget reconciliation process originally was designed to facilitate the adoption of deficit reduction legislation. More recently, the process has been used to enact major tax or spending policy changes when one party controls both the White House and Congress, but does not have a 60-vote ‘filibuster-proof’ majority in the Senate. In addition to its use for the 2017 tax reform act, Republicans were able to use this process to enact the Bush tax cuts in 2001 and 2003, and Democrats used this legislative mechanism to enact the 2010 Affordable Care Act.

In advance of the 2018 midterm elections, the then Republican-controlled House passed ‘tax reform 2.0’ legislation to make permanent certain provisions of the 2017 legislation applicable to individuals and pass-through businesses that otherwise are set to sunset after 2025. The GOP House bill was projected to reduce federal revenues by an additional \$630 billion over the current 10-year budget period (2019-2028), with nearly all of this revenue effect occurring in the final three years of the budget period after 2025. The Senate did not act on this bill.

Observation: The revenue cost of addressing the 2017 tax reform act’s temporary individual provisions increases by roughly \$300 billion each year, as additional years after the 2025 sunset are included in the budget ‘window.’ Thus, if no action is taken until 2025, for example, to address the automatic sunset of individual provisions, including the pass-through business deduction, the future 10-year (2026-2035) cost of making permanent all of the 2017 individual tax reform provisions would be nearly \$3 trillion.

Legislative action to turn off automatic modifications to key business provisions also would have a significant revenue cost. For example, according to Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) staff revenue estimates that were provided for the 2017 Act, the amount of revenue initially projected to be raised by requiring five-year amortization of research expenditures beginning in 2022 was \$119.7 billion for the final six years of the Act's original 10-year budget period. The cost of repealing this revenue-raising provision and other business provision modifications that were intended to offset part of the cost of tax reform increases each year that such provisions remain part of current law. Put differently, should Congress ultimately wish to repeal these provisions, the longer it waits to act the greater the projected revenue loss will be within future budget windows.

Note: At the beginning of the new Congress, House Democrats approved changes to the Rules of the House that include reinstating a 'pay-as-you-go' (PAYGO) rule that would require offsets for new tax cuts or new mandatory spending proposals. This rule can be waived by a simple-majority vote in the House. House Democrats also repealed a previous House rule adopted by Republicans that required 'dynamic' macroeconomic revenue estimates for significant tax or spending proposals.

Given the current political balance of power in Congress and sharp differences over fiscal policy, it seems unlikely that President Trump and the current Congress will reach agreement on how to address sunsets and other scheduled changes to the 2017 tax reform act. Democrats in particular have expressed concerns about the Act's fiscal sustainability as well as concerns over specific provisions.

Final action to make permanent some or all of the Act's individual provisions is likely to be delayed at least until after the 2020 presidential elections, and possibly not until after the 2024 presidential election. Similarly, it appears unlikely the current Congress will enact substantive changes to business tax provisions subject to automatic changes in future years.

Observation: Businesses will need to take into account the automatic modification under current law of certain business provisions when preparing financial statements and making future business plans. For example, current and future transactions involving debt may be affected by the more restrictive limitation on interest deductions that will take effect under current law in 2022, absent any action by Congress. For more on tax accounting issues related to tax laws and regulations, see Appendix D.

The details of a future legislative agreement to resolve debate over the sustainability of the 2017 tax reform act will depend on who controls the White House and Congress at that time. In late 2012, for example, then President Obama and a Republican-controlled Congress enacted 'fiscal cliff' legislation that made permanent nearly all of the Bush-era tax cuts that were set to expire automatically at the end of that year, but allowed scheduled tax increases to go into effect for upper-income individuals.

Observation: While the current 21% corporate income tax rate is a 'permanent' tax law provision, all business and individual tax reform provisions could be open to re-negotiation as part of any future compromise 'fiscal cliff 2.0' agreement.

Tax extenders

Both the House and Senate last year considered but did not enact 'tax extender' proposals to extend retroactively more than 30 provisions that had expired before the end of 2017, including various renewable energy provisions, targeted tax depreciation provisions, and a deduction for mortgage insurance premiums. Two additional provisions expired at the end of last year without being extended: one temporarily lowered the adjusted gross income (AGI) floor for the individual itemized medical expense deduction from 10% to 7.5%, and the second provided a temporary increase in a Black Lung Disability Trust Fund excise tax on coal. A number of significant tax provisions also are scheduled to expire at the end of 2019, including the Subpart F rule for look-through payments between related foreign controlled corporations, the work opportunity tax credit (WOTC), and the new markets tax credit.

The JCT staff last year issued a report on expired or expiring tax provisions covering the years 2016 through 2027, which includes expiring tax reform provisions (the report does not include provisions subject to automatic modifications with delayed effective date, such as the scheduled change to amortization of research expenditures and the more restrictive limitation on interest deductions to take effect in 2022). For a year-by-year list of expired or expiring provisions, see Appendix E.

House Ways and Means Chairman Neal and Senate Finance Chairman Grassley have both indicated that they may seek to take action early this year on tax extender legislation. In the past, it has been difficult for Congress to enact a tax extender bill separately from some other larger legislative package. As noted above, consideration of government funding legislation and the coming debate over increasing the statutory federal debt could provide an opportunity for Congress to consider tax and spending proposals.

The details of a future legislative agreement to resolve debate over the sustainability of the 2017 tax reform act will depend on who controls the White House and Congress at that time.

Other legislative issues

Infrastructure

President Trump and Congressional Democratic leaders have made infrastructure a policy priority this year, but reaching an agreement on funding will remain the most significant challenge to a bipartisan agreement. No transportation authorization deadline this year forces action on infrastructure legislation.

In 2018, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115–254), a five-year reauthorization through FY 2023 for the FAA and federal excise taxes on aviation fuel and air transportation services.

Congress in 2015 enacted a five-year reauthorization of federal highway and mass transit programs. The Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-94) provided \$305 billion for federal transportation programs through FY 2020, with \$235 billion coming from federal fuel excise taxes and the remaining \$70 billion offset by non-transportation sources.

Observation: Increased fuel efficiency and an increase in alternative-fuel and electric vehicles mean that current levels of federal fuel excise taxes are not sufficient to fund existing transportation programs, let alone provide funding for new infrastructure plans. Currently, projected trust fund receipts fall short of the amounts needed simply to maintain current projected spending by roughly \$20 billion per year.

The federal excise taxes of 18.4 cents per gallon for gasoline and 24.4 cents per gallon for diesel fuel have been unchanged since 1993. A number of bills have been introduced in recent years to index federal fuel taxes for inflation. For example, if the 18.4 cents per gallon gas tax had been indexed to inflation in 1993, it would be about 32 cents per gallon now.

President Trump's FY 2019 budget proposed an infrastructure plan that called for \$200 billion in new federal funds to leverage \$1.3 trillion in increased funding by state and local governments and the private sector.

Senate Democrats in 2018 proposed to increase infrastructure spending by \$1 trillion, with funding to come from changes to the 2017 tax reform act that included increasing the corporate income tax rate to 25%, restoring a 39.6% top individual income tax rate, and reinstating pre-reform AMT and estate tax provisions. Senate Minority Leader Schumer last December also sent a letter to President Trump calling for climate change policies to be part of any infrastructure legislation.



To address decreasing fuel tax revenues, incoming House Transportation Committee Chairman Peter DeFazio (D-OR) announced plans to propose a national vehicle miles traveled (VMT) pilot program. The program would allow drivers to opt in and receive a rebate for the estimated gas tax that would have been paid and could include ‘congestion pricing’ to adjust for differences between rural and urban driving. Other potential revenue sources that have been mentioned could include reinstating Superfund taxes as well as general revenue sources.

Healthcare

In a 55-page decision, Judge Reed O’Connor of the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas on December 14, 2018 ruled that changes to the ACA that were enacted as part of the 2017 tax reform act had the effect of making the entirety of the 2010 law unconstitutional. He held that Congress effectively had removed the tax penalty for failing to obtain health insurance coverage by lowering it to \$0 as part of the 2017 Act, and as a result, the individual mandate to purchase health insurance no longer could be supported as an exercise of Congress’s tax power, as the US Supreme Court had ruled in 2012.

More significantly, Judge O’Connor ruled that the entirety of the ACA is unconstitutional, since he held that all of the ACA’s provisions are inseparable from the law’s individual mandate provision. As a result, he ruled as invalid all other provisions of the law, including protections for pre-existing conditions, a ban on lifetime caps, and the requirement that employers cover employees’ children under the age of 26. The judge’s ruling puts at risk the ACA’s expanded Medicaid coverage, which has been adopted so far by 37 states, including most recently Virginia and Utah.

The challenge to the ACA’s constitutionality was brought by a group of Republican State Attorneys General and was supported by the Trump Administration. A group of Democratic State Attorneys General announced plans to appeal Judge’s O’Connor’s ruling. During this appeal, Judge O’Connor has stayed his ruling and the Administration has stated that the ACA remains in effect pending further judicial action.

President Trump and many Republicans in Congress welcomed Judge O’Connor’s ruling and called for legislative action to replace the ACA while preserving consumer provisions like the protection for pre-existing conditions. House Speaker Pelosi stated that the House Democrats would formally intervene in the judicial proceedings in support of the ACA and would ‘reject Republican efforts to destroy the ACA.’ Meanwhile, a number of progressive Democrats in Congress have signaled that they intend to offer new healthcare proposals that go beyond the ACA to provide ‘Medicare-for-all’ or some other form of significant Medicare expansion.



ACA-related tax provisions generally remain in effect while Judge O'Connor's ruling is appealed, although previously enacted legislation has suspended or delayed the effective dates of certain provisions. Congress this year may consider a further delay or suspension of the excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health plans (the so-called 'Cadillac tax'), which now is scheduled to go into effect in 2022; the 2.3% excise tax on the sale of medical devices, which is set to become effective beginning in 2020; and the annual fee imposed on certain health insurers, which also is set to take effect in 2020.

The 2018 year-end tax bill passed by the House proposed further delaying those three ACA taxes and repealing the tax on indoor tanning services, but, as noted above, that legislation was not acted on by the Senate.

As also noted above, House and Senate Democrats have indicated that they may propose tax technical corrections legislation related to the 2010 ACA. After Republicans gained control of the House following the 2010 elections, they voted on numerous occasions to repeal the ACA and blocked most efforts to enact corrections to the law.

While a divided Congress debates healthcare policy, the Trump administration is expected to continue to take related regulatory actions, including reducing regulations on healthcare providers, reforming federal drug pricing practices, and encouraging states to impose new work-related Medicaid eligibility requirements. A report issued in December 2018 by the Departments of Labor, Treasury, and Health and Human Services provided 56 health policy recommendations, including a recommendation to finalize a rule that would increase the type of health expenses for which employees can be reimbursed by their employers in health reimbursement arrangements. Some recommendations in the report may require legislation, such as proposals to expand the availability of tax-advantaged health savings accounts and to increase account contribution limits.

Retirement

House Ways and Means Chairman Neal has stated that retirement issues will be a priority this year, with a particular focus on increasing the number of employees covered by a workplace retirement plan. A bill (H.R. 4523) introduced in 2017 by Chairman Neal would require an employer with more than 10 employees to offer and automatically enroll employees into a payroll-deduction individual retirement account (IRA), if the employer currently does not sponsor a qualifying retirement plan; a tax credit would be provided to employers that do not have more than 100 employees for costs associated with establishing 'auto-IRAs.' During the previous Congress, he sponsored or co-sponsored eight retirement bills covering policy issues that include non-discrimination requirements, leakage from 401(k) plans, retirement-plan tax credits for small employers, portability of managed accounts, annuity plans, and required minimum distributions.

Retirement legislation considered last year in both the House and Senate would have addressed various issues, including:

- multiple employer plans and pooled employer plans
- rules relating to election of safe-harbor 401(k) status
- repeal of maximum age for traditional IRA contributions
- a prohibition on qualified employer plans from making loans through credit cards
- portability of lifetime income investments
- the treatment of custodial accounts on termination of Section 403(b) plans
- clarification of retirement income account rules relating to church-controlled organizations
- an increase in the 10% cap for an automatic enrollment safe harbor after the first plan year
- an increase in the credit limitation for small-employer pension plan startup costs
- a small-employer automatic enrollment credit
- an exemption from required minimum distribution rules for individuals with certain account balances
- elective deferrals by members of the Ready Reserve of a reserve component of the Armed Forces.

The 2018 year-end tax bill approved by the House but not considered by the Senate included provisions to promote retirement savings and address issues related to certain employer-provided retirement savings programs, including multi-employer and pooled employer plans. The House in September also passed a separate retirement bill (H.R. 6757) containing many of the same proposals. In the previous Congress, then Senate Finance Committee Chairman Hatch introduced similar retirement legislation (S. 2526); this bill was cosponsored by Finance Ranking Member Wyden.

IRS reforms and tax administration

While reduced IRS funding levels have affected the agency's operations over the past several years, there has been some bipartisan support in Congress for legislation to improve tax administration and IRS operations.

The House's 2018 year-end tax bill included a bipartisan IRS reform package that would modernize the IRS and focus on taxpayer service. The bill included provisions to establish an Independent Office of Appeals, develop a comprehensive customer service strategy, modify certain enforcement procedures, and modify the IRS's organizational structure. In addition, the bill called for modernizing the IRS through cybersecurity and identity protection programs, development of information technology, and expanded use of electronic systems. (The House earlier last year also had approved similar measures as part of 12 separate IRS reform bills.) As noted above, the Senate took no action on the House-passed year-end tax package, although the IRS reforms themselves were generally supported by both Republicans and Democrats.

The House on December 20 voted 378 to 11 to pass the IRS reform provisions from then Chairman Brady's year-end bill as a new stand-alone measure (H.R. 7227), in a hope that the Senate might agree by unanimous consent to clear these proposals for signing by President Trump. However, no action was taken by the Senate on this legislation before the start of the new Congress.

In the last Congress, then Finance Chairman Hatch and Ranking Member Wyden introduced a bipartisan IRS reform bill (S. 3246). Finance Committee members Rob Portman (R-OH) and Ben Cardin (D-MD) also introduced a separate bipartisan IRS reform bill (S. 3278).

Note: Unenacted bills from the last Congress would have to be re-introduced, possibly with changes in language.

Budget constraints


It is possible that rising federal budget deficits will be a factor in how the 116th Congress considers tax legislation. In recent years, however, budget deficits have had little impact on tax or spending decisions. For example, Congress has routinely set aside budget spending caps for annual defense and non-defense discretionary appropriations; action was taken in 2017 to increase annual federal discretionary spending by approximately \$150 billion above statutory spending caps for both FY 2018 and FY 2019. The House and Senate are expected to continue ongoing debate over the the long-term sustainability of federal mandatory spending programs, such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.

The federal government's annual budget deficit was \$779 billion, or 3.9% of GDP, at the end of FY 2018. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the deficit for current FY 2019 will be approximately \$1 trillion, or 4.6% of GDP. By FY 2028, the deficit is forecast to rise to \$1.5 trillion, or 5.1% of GDP.

The CBO budget forecasts, as shown in Figure 6, are based on current law. They assume that 2017 tax reform individual tax cuts will sunset as scheduled at the end of 2025, tax reform provisions subject to automatic modification will remain in effect, and no action will be taken to address other expired or expiring tax provisions. The CBO projections also assume current spending caps are not exceeded, which has not been the case in recent years.



Figure 6: Rising federal deficits may affect future tax policy



Source: Congressional Budget Office, May 2018

■ Election year

CBO on December 13, 2018 released a 326-page report on options for reducing the deficit, describing the pros and cons of 121 policy options that would decrease federal spending or increase federal revenues over the next decade. CBO notes that its report “is meant to help inform federal lawmakers about the implications of possible policy choices. The options are not recommendations by CBO, nor do they constitute an exhaustive list; rather, they are intended to reflect a range of possibilities.”

The CBO report often is used by elected officials to identify provisions that may be proposed to reduce budget deficits or to fund new legislative proposals. While most of the policy options identified by CBO are not new, the CBO report does illustrate the potential revenue effects of modifying certain elements of the 2017 tax reform act.

The CBO report includes 40 tax-related items, such as increasing individual and corporate tax rates, increasing specific excise taxes, imposing new fees, and increasing funding for IRS enforcement initiatives. For example, CBO reports that raising all tax rates on individual ordinary income by one percentage point would increase federal revenues by \$905.4 billion between 2019 and 2028, while increasing income tax rates in only the two highest brackets by one percentage point would increase revenues by \$123.4 billion over the same period. CBO projects that a one percentage point increase in the federal corporate income tax rate would raise \$96 billion. For more details on select CBO deficit-reduction revenue options, see Appendix F.

Observation: Many of the CBO policy options are considered controversial and illustrate the political challenges policymakers face in attempting to reduce federal budget deficits or to fund new legislation.



Trade policy

Key areas of focus for President Trump's trade policies have been to secure a new trade agreement with Canada and Mexico that would replace the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and to address a range of issues associated with relations between the United States and China. The Administration also has announced efforts to negotiate several new trade agreements, including with the European Union and Japan, as well as an intent to negotiate a future trade agreement with the United Kingdom if possible following resolution of the UK's efforts to leave the EU. The Trump Administration in 2018 also renegotiated a small part of the existing free trade agreement with South Korea.

President Trump is expected to continue relying on the authority provided by past Congresses to impose tariffs and other trade sanctions as he pursues his trade policy agenda. The US Court of International Trade last year began consideration of a lawsuit brought by steel importers and foreign producers, arguing that Congress improperly delegated too much of its constitutional authority over trade. The suit specifically challenges the legal authority cited by the Trump administration to impose steel and aluminum tariffs on the basis of national security concerns under Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. A ruling is expected later this year.

United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)

On November 30, 2018, President Trump, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and outgoing Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto signed the USMCA, replacing NAFTA. The new agreement leaves in place the basic framework of NAFTA, but updates the arrangement with new labor and environmental standards, a new chapter on trade in digital goods, stronger intellectual property protections, and a more stringent set of requirements for automobiles and automotive parts to qualify for tariff-free access in North America. The agreement now must be ratified.

In the United States, trade promotion authority (TPA), also known as 'fast track' trade negotiating authority, sets out a timeline for US ratification of USMCA. Upon signature on November 30, a 60-day clock started to prepare a description of changes to US law that would be required to bring the United States into compliance with USMCA. By March 15, 2019, 105 days after entering the agreement, the International Trade Commission (ITC) must submit its report assessing the agreement to Congress.

Under the TPA timeline, the President submits a draft statement of administrative action and a copy of the legal text of agreement to Congress at least 30 days before submitting a bill implementing the agreement to Congress for consideration. Lastly, before the implementing bill

is introduced in the House and Senate, the President submits a copy of the final legal text of the agreement along with an environmental review, an employment impact review, a report on labor rights, and a plan for implementing and enforcing the agreement.

The greatest uncertainty for ratification lies with the United States. In Mexico, a simple majority vote in its Senate is required to ratify USMCA. The current Mexican president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, reportedly has enough support for the agreement to pass. However, some in Mexico prefer that the new president wait until the United States ratifies the deal before moving forward. In Canada, no parliamentary vote is required before the cabinet ratifies the USMCA, and it is expected the agreement will be ratified without issue. The timing of Canadian cabinet ratification, however, is uncertain.

Congressional approval of USMCA implementation legislation will require bipartisan agreement between the House and Senate, where trade issues historically have highlighted differences both between and within each political party. House and Senate Democrats are expected to focus on concerns raised by US labor unions that stronger provisions are needed to ensure enforcement of the USMCA-proposed improvements to Mexican labor law. Similarly, Republican support is not guaranteed. For example, then House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Brady last year stated that the investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms need to be broadened to include all sectors; he also expressed concerns over proposed sunset provisions that would require future renegotiation of the deal to keep it intact.

President Trump repeatedly has voiced his intentions to declare that the United States is withdrawing from NAFTA, in an effort to pressure Congress to pass USMCA or be left with no trilateral North American trade agreement. President Trump's legal authority to withdraw from NAFTA may be subject to question, as no president has sought to withdraw from an enacted trade agreement. Since NAFTA was implemented by law, some argue that such a withdrawal would require Congressional approval.

Under NAFTA, a notice of withdrawal does not become effective for six months. A withdrawal notification by the President therefore would allow Congress up to six months to ratify the new agreement without a lapse, provided the President's authority in this area is not tested or is sustained. While it is possible that the President may be threatening to use authority he may not have, a presidential notification of NAFTA withdrawal would mean greater uncertainty for business and possibly could result in higher tariffs, particularly for American firms and farmers selling into the Mexican market.

US-China trade

During his 2016 presidential campaign, President Trump stated that he would impose tariffs on goods sold into the United States by certain countries if they engage in unfair trade practices. He cited presidential authority to impose tariffs under various existing trade provisions, including Section 301 of the

Trade Act of 1974, which provides the President with the ability to take retaliatory actions against any country that violates or otherwise denies benefits under any trade agreement with the United States.

Observation: The Congress over many decades has delegated much of its authority over trade matters to the executive branch, so that President Trump has considerable discretion to impose tariffs or quotas on trade with other countries.

The United States Trade Representative (USTR) released a Section 301 report on China in March 2018 and subsequently released a proposed list of tariffs on \$50 billion worth of Chinese imports in April 2018, which were implemented in two phases. Over the next several months, the United States and China announced various retaliatory tariffs on increasing amounts of goods at 10% and 25% rates. On September 24, a third phase of tariffs on \$200 billion of Chinese imports went into effect at 10%.

On November 20, 2018, USTR released a statement as an update on its Section 301 investigation of China stating, "We completed this update as part of this Administration's strengthened monitoring and enforcement effort. This update shows that China has not fundamentally altered its unfair, unreasonable, and market-distorting practices that were the subject of the March 2018 report on our Section 301 investigation."

On December 1, 2018, President Trump met with China's President Xi Jinping to attempt to de-escalate the reciprocal tariffs the two countries had placed on each other's strategic industries. According to a White House readout of the meeting, the United States agreed not to increase the "List III" tariffs on \$200 billion worth of Chinese product from 10% to 25%, as had been scheduled to go into effect, for a period of 90 days (that is, until March 1, 2019) while other negotiations continue.

Over this period, President Trump and President Xi will negotiate structural changes over fundamental issues that have been raised by the United States, such as forced technology transfer, intellectual property protection, non-tariff barriers, cyber intrusions and theft, market access for services, and agriculture. If an agreement is not in place by March 1, 2019, President Trump said he will raise those 10% tariffs to 25%. No agreement was reached regarding other tariffs currently on Chinese goods, although the 90-day period means it is unlikely the United States would go beyond the current three rounds of tariffs it has already levied for now. Chinese officials have indicated they are serious about achieving an agreement by offering concessions on purchases of American agricultural commodities and revisiting central planks of their government-driven economic agenda, such as investment restrictions on foreign companies and forced technology transfer.

US and Chinese officials have expressed differences over trade talk goals, and the outcome of talks remains unclear. While the United States has trade disagreements with a number of its traditional allies, efforts to address trade and economic disputes with China are complicated by national security concerns and other issues that have been raised by the United States and other nations.

Trade agreements currently in effect:

- Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015
- American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act of 2016
- Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
- Generalized System of Preferences
- Free trade agreements:
 - Australia Free Trade Agreement (AUFITA)
 - Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (BHFTA)
 - Central American - Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)
 - Chile Free Trade Agreement (CLFTA)
 - Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (COPTA)
 - Israel Free Trade Agreement (ILFTA)
 - Jordan Free Trade Agreement (JOFTA)
 - Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS)
 - Morocco Free Trade Agreement (MAFTA)
 - North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
 - Oman Free Trade Agreement (OMFTA)
 - Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (PATPA)
 - Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PETPA)
 - Singapore Free Trade Agreement (SGFTA)
- African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) - effective through 2025



Global tax policy

The uncertainties for US and non-US multinational corporations (MNCs) created by global tax issues and disputes likely will remain for some time. The impact of US tax reform continues to be closely monitored by other countries as they consider whether to introduce their own unilateral and multilateral reforms.

The OECD Inclusive Framework – which is committed to implementing the BEPS minimum standards – now has over 120 member countries and continues to expand. Under a mandate of the G20, the OECD seeks consensus among this large and diverse group of countries on the implementation and monitoring of the BEPS Project, and on the accelerated project reviewing the tax challenges of digitalization.

Meanwhile, the EU has taken a more active role in tax policy, implementing (and going beyond) the BEPS recommendations, reviewing and overruling domestic tax measures and rulings, and seeking agreement among its members and the international community around short-term and long-term measures to tax digital activities.

Digitalization of the economy

The taxation of the digitalization of the global economy continues to be a focus for policymakers and MNCs.

Background

Following the G20's request in 2017 for the OECD to accelerate its post-BEPS review of the tax challenges of digitalization, 2018 saw significant developments in terms of the OECD's progress in exploring a global solution that could be agreed to by the Inclusive Framework countries. At the same time, unilateral measures have been developed by individual countries and the

EU in lieu of a global agreement. Proponents of regional and unilateral measures claim that they are necessary to encourage international agreement and meet short-term revenue needs and perceptions of fairness in the tax system. However, some US officials publicly have expressed concern at these measures, arguing that they create transatlantic trade barriers by discriminating against US businesses.

OECD efforts

Building on the 2015 BEPS Action 1 Report, the OECD in March 2018 released an Interim Report that includes an in-depth analysis of the changes to business models and value creation arising from digitalization. The Interim Report stated that the following characteristics are frequently observed in certain highly digitalized business models:

- cross-jurisdictional scale without mass
- reliance on intangible assets
- the importance of data, user participation, and their synergies with intellectual property.

Describing the potential implications for international tax rules, the Interim Report identifies the positions that different countries hold, which drive their approach to possible solutions. Some countries take the position that no action is needed, others consider there is a need for action that would take into account user contributions (i.e., in 'digital' business models), and still others consider that any changes should apply to the economy more broadly. The Interim Report paved the way to move forward at the OECD toward a long-term multilateral solution in the next phase of work.

By late 2018, three proposals for long-term measures emerged, around which groups of countries had coalesced (each led by at least one major G7 economy). The OECD confirmed in November that:



'Following the US tax reform, the United States has in particular agreed to engage in the search of a global solution which would address further challenges. Equally, France and Germany have now proposed to explore the feasibility of a global anti-base erosion mechanism. The United Kingdom made a proposal focused on a reallocation of taxing rights based on active user contribution in some business models. Many other countries are now involved actively in this discussion.'

The OECD plans to release a second interim report by summer 2019, and is seeking to deliver a final report in 2020. The OECD reportedly has confirmed that a progress update will be released in January 2019.

EU developments

In March 2018 (five days after the OECD Interim Report was released), the European Commission published a digital tax package, with a range of recommendations for the EU. The two main recommendations were proposals for formal EU Directives calling for:

- A comprehensive long-term solution through setting a 'significant digital presence' threshold and rules for attributing profits thereto (effectively a 'Digital PE').
- The introduction of a 3% 'turnover' tax on gross receipts from the sale or rental of users' data, targeted advertising, or provision of multi-sided digital platforms (i.e., marketplaces) that allow users to find and interact with each other—the Digital Services Tax (DST). This tax would apply wherever the paid services are provided from or to, to the extent that there are 'users' of the related interfaces located in the EU.

The Austrian Presidency of the European Council prioritized the DST throughout the second half of 2018, but despite several amendments to scope and timing (e.g., sunset and sunrise clauses), European Finance Ministers did not reach an agreement at their December meeting. France and Germany requested at that time that the proposal's scope be reduced to apply only to advertising. A revised proposal on this basis will continue to be discussed in early 2019; proponents continue to push for an EU agreement before the European elections in May 2019, although it remains to be seen if the new Romanian Council presidency will prioritize the issue and can garner the required unanimous agreement.

Observation: As EU Directives are effectively 'minimum standards,' the scope reduction may not stop individual Member States from applying the levy more broadly.

Unilateral measures and proposals

A number of countries have introduced (or are in the process of introducing) their own unilateral measures:

- In 2016, India introduced an equalization levy (effectively a gross withholding tax) of 6% for some advertising services provided by non-residents. Chile, Mexico, and New Zealand have indicated that they may seek to introduce similar measures (although some would apply to a broader range of activities).
- India also has legislated to lower its taxing rights threshold to where there is a 'significant economic presence' in India from April 2019. Although detailed guidance has not yet been released, the 2018 consultation suggested that there would be revenue thresholds for goods/services, or user number thresholds that could trigger a taxable presence in India. This measure will apply only when there is no tax treaty between India and the other country.
- The United Kingdom has proposed its own DST to be legislated in 2019 and to be effective April 2020. The tax is expected to be levied at 2% on gross receipts generated directly or indirectly from in-scope activities, namely, the provision of online search engine, marketplace, or social media services to UK users. Global and 'in scope' revenue thresholds will apply, and a safe harbor will be available to reduce the cost for activities that the UK deems to be loss making or low margin.
- In addition to a DST, the UK is introducing a requirement for companies in certain countries receiving royalty income in relation to sales made to UK customers to account for UK tax on the 'indirect' use of such intangibles.
- The UK and Australia each have enacted diverted profits taxes as part of their anti-base erosion regimes.
- Austria, France, Italy, and Spain each are in the process of implementing (or have announced they will implement) measures similar to the European Commission's DST proposals, regardless of whether EU agreement is reached.
- Hong Kong has legislated that where a person has contributed (in Hong Kong) to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation (DEMPE) of intellectual property (IP) and income is derived by a non-Hong Kong resident who is an associate of that person from the use of (or a right to use) such IP outside Hong Kong, the part of the income that is attributable to the value creation contributions in Hong Kong will be regarded as a taxable trading receipt arising in or derived from a trade or business carried on in Hong Kong.
- Uruguay and Taiwan have legislated withholding taxes for some online services; other countries such as Pakistan are considering such measures.
- A number of countries, including Argentina, Colombia, Malaysia, and Uruguay, have reformed their VAT rules to tax online sales in the place where the consumer is located.

Other OECD developments

Multilateral Instrument and other treaty developments

In November 2017, the OECD Council approved the latest version of the OECD Model Tax Convention, introducing all of the treaty changes that were included in the October 2015 BEPS recommendations.

The Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS (MLI) entered into force on July 1, 2018, following Slovenia's ratification (Slovenia was the fifth country to ratify, which commenced the waiting period before automatic entry into force). This agreement will sit alongside existing bilateral tax treaties between the parties and effectively amend them in line with the parties' agreed positions under the MLI. While the United States has not signed the MLI, US groups could be impacted to the extent that their subsidiaries rely on treaties between other jurisdictions.

While the dates of entry into effect for each of the provisions is calculated mechanically, a range of dates will apply for each party's treaties. These dates also could change treaty by treaty, or based upon the other party's elections. For the changes to each individual double tax treaty, different effective dates potentially apply for withholding taxes, other taxes, mutual agreement procedures to resolve disputes, and the use of arbitration to resolve disputes. As more countries ratify the MLI (and mandatory periods of time pass), more bilateral treaties will change, making this development increasingly important throughout 2019.

Observation: One of the MLI's most significant provisions may be its 'principal purpose test,' an anti-avoidance rule included in almost all the amended treaties, which invalidates treaty benefits when a principal purpose of using the treaty is to gain a tax advantage.

The impact of the MLI first will be seen beginning January 1, 2019, when withholding tax provisions will enter into effect for the bilateral treaties between Australia, Austria, France, the Isle of Man, Israel, Japan, Jersey, Lithuania, New Zealand, Poland, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Country-by-Country reporting and information exchange

Following the introduction of Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting rules around the world in relation to 2016 and future financial years, the United States first required filing in 2018 in relation to 2017 financial years. Voluntary filing was permitted in relation to 2016.

A vast – but not universal – network of multilateral and bilateral exchange agreements have been signed so that MNCs would not need to file in all countries with similar rules. Instead, tax administrations could share the reports of the MNC's ultimate parent entity or an elected surrogate.



Because the United States did not sign the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, it has had to rely on bilateral exchange agreements. In total, the United States has (or is negotiating) around 50 such agreements. However, over 60 jurisdictions have enacted or proposed legislation requiring local filing in the absence of exchange agreements, and the IRS continues to work on reaching as many agreements as possible.

Observation: During 2018, the OECD released further guidance to assist taxpayers and tax administrations in interpreting the CbC model legislation in a consistent way, such as definitions of revenue, preferred prorating methodology, and treatment of merger and acquisition scenarios. However, some differences in interpretation and law remain, posing challenges for MNCs operating in jurisdictions that do not have exchange agreements in place with their ultimate parent's jurisdiction.

As part of the OECD's Action 13 BEPS Report, the OECD committed to reassessing the CbC regime no later than the end of 2020.

Transfer pricing

The OECD's Working Party 6 (WP6) issued final guidance on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments on March 21, 2018, and the application of the profit split method on June 21, 2018. Both final reports were broadly consistent with drafts released in 2016 and 2017, but with some useful statements that might help prevent double taxation within a country and encourage (but not mandate) consistency and openness in approaches.

Final guidance for tax administrations regarding the application of the post-BEPS approach for 'hard to value intangibles' — i.e., those where no reliable comparables exist and the valuation elements are highly uncertain — also was released on June 21, 2018. This guidance confirms that, under certain conditions, intangibles-related returns pertaining to periods after a transaction can be used as presumptive evidence to consider whether the price set at the time of the transaction was appropriate. Some attention is given to dispute prevention and resolution in relation to the approach, in particular through encouraging (but not mandating) the use of bilateral advance pricing arrangements and access to the mutual agreement procedure (MAP).

The OECD on July 3, 2018 released a long-awaited discussion draft on the transfer pricing of financial transactions. The draft focuses on treasury functions, guarantee fees, and captive insurance. This non-consensus document remains open on many issues, and the OECD hopes to issue a consensus discussion paper this year.

Tax certainty

The OECD is undertaking a project seeking to clarify treaty interpretations. As a first step, the OECD is looking to identify the areas within treaties causing the most uncertainty, and then will seek to identify ways in which these issues could be resolved.

The OECD continues to monitor implementation of BEPS Action 14 (more effective dispute resolution), undertake peer reviews on all of its members, and look at actions taken by other countries. Seven of the 10 batches had been completed by the end of 2018.

The pilot International Compliance Assurance Programme (ICAP), commenced in January 2018, included the United States and several other OECD countries. This voluntary program sought to assess risk of 'not high-risk' MNCs multilaterally across the participating countries. Interested MNCs were able to communicate through their CbC reports with tax administrations, and then deal with one lead administration for follow-up. If this pilot is agreed to be successful, it may be rolled out more widely in future years.



Other EU developments

The European Parliament will hold elections in 2019, after which a new Commission President will be nominated by the Council and approved by the Parliament. This process may slow down the passage of existing legislative initiatives. Also, depending on the new Parliament and Commission and the priorities of the new Romanian and Finnish Council presidencies, the legislative agenda itself also may shift. As discussed below, the UK also is scheduled to leave the European Union on March 29, 2019.

Mandatory disclosure rules (MDR)

In response to the recommendations of the TAXE and TAXE II Parliamentary Committees, and following the European Commission's legislative proposals to the European Council in 2017, the Council in June 2018 agreed to common rules that require advisers and other intermediaries (and sometimes taxpayers themselves) to report transactions where certain hallmarks of 'aggressive' tax planning are met. The time frame for reporting 'in-scope' transactions commenced on June 25, 2018, although the first reports will not need to be made until August 31, 2020, unless Member States choose to accelerate this requirement unilaterally, as has been seen first in Poland. In-scope transactions entered into from July 1, 2020 will need to be reported within 30 days of the advice being given (or the transactions being implemented), although again this can be accelerated through Member States' early adoption as has been observed in Poland.

Observation: The hallmarks for identifying in-scope transactions are defined broadly, and many commercial transactions will fall within the scope of the rules. Unfortunately, while the reporting requirement already is effective, currently there is little proposed legislation in EU countries implementing this requirement, so the full scope is not yet known. Relevant reportable cross-border arrangements involving an EU territory will need to be disclosed to the relevant national tax authority within the required time frame.

The obligation falls to the taxpayer where there is no EU-based intermediary or where legal and professional privilege applies for advice provided by the intermediary. The disclosures will be shared quarterly between the tax authorities of all Member States.

What information needs to be disclosed?

- Taxpayer names, place and date of birth (for individuals), residence
- Taxpayer identification numbers
- Details of relevant associated persons
- Description of the arrangements
- Date on which the first step was or will be made
- Value of the transaction

The hallmarks

Hallmarks that are subject to the tax main benefit test:

- **Generic hallmarks** - These are confidentiality, premium fee, and standardized tax arrangement hallmarks.
- **Specific hallmarks with a tax main benefit** - This includes acquiring a loss-making company, converting taxable income into capital gains or exempt income, and circular or offsetting transactions.
- **Specific hallmarks related to cross-border transactions** - Deductible cross-border payments, where the recipient is resident in a state whose corporate tax rate is zero or 'almost zero' (not defined), or the receipt is exempt or the payment benefits from a preferential tax regime.

Hallmarks not subject to the tax main benefit test:

- **Specific hallmarks related to cross-border transactions** - Deductible cross-border payments, where the recipient is resident nowhere, or is resident in a State that is included in an EU or OECD list of uncooperative tax jurisdictions; deductions for depreciation on the same asset are claimed in more than one jurisdiction; double tax relief is claimed in more than one jurisdiction; or there is a transfer of assets and there is a material difference between the consideration in the two jurisdictions.
- **Specific hallmarks concerning automatic exchange of information and beneficial ownership** - These apply even if a tax advantage is not the main benefit, and include structures involving holding companies and trusts, whereby the identity of the beneficial owners are made 'unidentifiable.'
- **Specific hallmarks concerning transfer pricing** - There are three hallmarks: arrangements involving unilateral safe harbor rules; arrangements involving the transfer of hard-to-value intangibles; and cross-border transfer of functions / risks /assets that result in the EBIT of the transferor to fall to less than 50% of what it would have been if the transfer had not been made.

State aid

The European Commission's State aid investigations continued through 2018, impacting both US and non-US MNC's and regimes.

In order to identify whether there is a selective advantage, the Commission now follows a three-step approach:

- What is the reference framework?
- Is there a derogation from that framework?
- Can the derogation be justified?

In February 2018, the EC published the non-confidential version of its final decision against Luxembourg from 2017 regarding royalty payments from a Luxembourg operating company to

a Luxembourg partnership that was not taxable in Luxembourg. The analysis included a more traditional approach to transfer pricing than some other decisions, finding the royalty rate to be too high.

Ireland last year announced that it has collected potentially recoverable State aid of €13bn, despite its case being under appeal. The Commission dropped further legal proceedings against Ireland over the collection of recoverable State aid while Ireland's appeal remains pending. The United States has been denied the opportunity to join the appeal as it was held not to have sufficiently justified the required interest in the case, despite the taxpayer being US-headquartered and thus any tax payable to Ireland potentially generating foreign tax credits that would impact the level of taxes paid in the United States.

In March 2018, the Commission published the non-confidential version of its opening decision on its rulings regarding an MNC's franchising arrangements. The annual intra-group license fee was found not to be a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome in line with the Commission's interpretation of the arm's-length principle, and the later intra-group transfer of the related proprietary rights was deemed not market value and/or the terms would not have been agreed to by independent undertakings.

In September 2018, the Commission published the non-confidential decision against Luxembourg in relation to a European taxpayer's financing activities, requesting that Luxembourg collect €120m from the taxpayer. The facts of the case broadly meant that financing costs recognized in the accounts of the holder of the intra-group instrument were deductible, but the income/gain for the issuer was covered by the Luxembourg participation exemption. The Commission found that the Luxembourg general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) should have applied to the arrangements, and also that whether the Luxembourg tax system or its participation exemption were the reference framework, the arrangements granted the taxpayer a selective advantage.

Soon after, however, the Commission found that there had been no State aid granted by Luxembourg with regard to the non-taxation of a US branch of a Luxembourg company. The Commission agreed that the non-taxation arose instead from a mismatch of tax laws.

In late December 2018, the Commission confirmed that it had reached a decision on its review of Gibraltar's 2011 exemption for interest, royalties, and dividends (which was amended in 2013). The Commission found that, while the dividend exemption may be justified on the grounds of avoiding double taxation, the exemption of interest and royalties has been found to be State aid. Further guidance is expected in 2019 to explain these findings in detail.

To date, the Commission has not published its final decision on the UK's Controlled Foreign Companies regime (specifically the financing exemptions included in that regime).

ATAD 2

Following on from the 2016 Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD), ATAD 2 was adopted in May 2017, extending the hybrid mismatch provisions to cover mismatches between EU and non-EU countries, as well as branch mismatches (upon which the OECD also released a final report in June 2017).

European Member States continue to introduce rules in line with ATAD, where required, in addition to their existing regimes. Member States have until January 1, 2020, to introduce the provisions, except rules regarding so-called 'reverse hybrids,' which may be delayed until January 1, 2022.

Public CbC reporting

Despite considerable press and political interest in proposals to require MNCs to publicly disclose elements of their CbC reports, no such requirements were adopted in 2018. However, the issue likely will be revisited in 2019 and future years.

Brexit and the potential impact for business

The EU is an economic and political union between 28 Member States. Many areas of law are standardized across the EU to create a single market allowing for free movement of people, goods, services, and capital between the Member States, and common policies on trade and many other areas are controlled by the EU as a group.

While tax policy remains generally within the competency of individual Member States, this is limited in practice where the impact of domestic policies would breach the fundamental freedoms of the EU (or amount to State aid). Some common rules – particularly those that are needed to further the objectives of the single market, such as elimination of many intra-group withholding taxes – have been introduced through unanimous agreement.



Accordingly, the implications of the United Kingdom's scheduled departure from the EU on March 29, 2019 (Brexit) are much broader than taxes. Failure to reach a deal or comprehensive withdrawal agreement would result in the UK reverting to trading with the EU (and/or other countries with which the EU has trade deals) on World Trade Organization terms from March 30, 2019. Neither the UK nor the EU see this as a desirable outcome, so both sides are seeking to reach an agreement that is as comprehensive as possible. Both sides' favored outcomes would result in a UK exit from the EU that is smoother than a 'no deal' scenario.

In the event that no such agreement is reached (i.e., a 'hard' Brexit), the immediate tax implications would include the following:

- Import VAT generally would be payable on the acquisition of goods between the UK and EU Member States (and vice versa).
- Customs import/export declarations would be required for goods transferred between the UK and EU Member States (and vice versa), and tariffs may become due (under WTO rules).
- EU VAT reliefs currently available to UK businesses no longer would be available.
- Access to bilateral tax treaties between the United States and some EU Member States may be denied (where the Limitation on Benefits clauses rely on a UK equivalent beneficiary being located in the EU).
- Increased withholding taxes would apply on flows between EU Member States and the UK where bilateral treaties do not reduce these to zero percent.
- Potential establishment of tax charges on assets previously transferred tax-free between EU Member States and the UK.
- Potential tax grouping issues would arise (e.g., where common ownership is held through the UK).
- Potential impact on tax paid in EU countries in relation to transactions with or subsidiaries in the UK.
- Guaranteed access to EU dispute resolution mechanisms, the European Court of Justice, and general principles of EU Law would not be available.

Observation: The details of Brexit could change quickly throughout early 2019. While avoiding a 'hard Brexit' is the stated aim of both sides, taxpayers should review their structures against a potential 'no deal' scenario to assess the effects of such a scenario, in addition to assessing any proposed agreement.

State tax policy

State fiscal conditions in 2018 showed significant improvement, with general revenue funds experiencing robust growth for the year. The near-term outlook remains strong, with revenues continuing to come in at or above budget levels. These enhanced revenues have allowed states to strengthen rainy-day reserves and increase general fund spending.

While state tax fiscal conditions have improved overall, a number of factors complicate state budget projections and policy trends, including the effects of the 2017 federal tax reform act, the impact of the 2018 midterm elections, and the increase in sales tax collection in many states as a result of the *South Dakota v. Wayfair* decision.

State tax impact of federal tax reform

Federal tax reform created several new income streams, limitations, and taxpayer benefits that states began to confront in 2018. Although there are many elements of federal tax reform relevant to state taxation, the Section 965 toll charge took center stage last year since it was first applicable for the 2017 tax year.

During the first half of 2018, state legislatures were active in enacting laws addressing state tax matters involving Section 965, including whether the toll charge amount qualifies for state deductions or modifications, whether states follow the Section 965(c) deduction, how income is apportioned, and whether expense disallowance applies. In addition, many states addressed conformity to the Section 163(j) interest limitations and Section 168(k) full expensing, and considered whether to tax global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) under Section 951A.

Using 2018 as a reference, an even higher level of activity is anticipated throughout 2019 as states continue to enact laws, promulgate regulations, and issue formal and informal guidance around conformity to federal tax reform. As seen during 2018, these changes may occur all year long, even until very shortly before reporting due dates.

There are many factors that will drive this expected level of increased activity in 2019, including:

- Section 965 remains an issue for the 2018 tax year and should be addressed if a state has not already done so.
- States will have to address a greater number of technical issues for the 2018 tax year, including Section 163(j), GILTI, FDII, and NOL changes. Although some states have addressed tax reform matters beyond Section 965, many states have not.
- States that did not address tax reform in 2018 will have to do so in 2019.
- States will have to address the technical matter of compliance with the federal consolidated return regulations that impact Section 965, Section 163(j), GILTI, and NOL calculations.

- States may have to correct or enhance prior guidance.
- States will provide compliance reporting guidance for federal tax reform matters.

As a result, the 2019 outlook for state taxation involves a year of constant activity as states continue to navigate through the numerous implications of federal tax reform.

The midterm elections

The 2018 midterm elections saw 87 of 99 state legislative chambers and 36 gubernatorial seats up for election. Democrats won seven governor’s offices that previously had been held by Republicans. Currently, Democrats hold the governor’s office in 23 states and Republicans hold the office in 27 states. In addition, Democrats gained control of both legislative chambers and the governor’s office in six states, with supermajorities in California, Illinois, and Oregon.

These changes are expected to have significant implications for tax policy within the states where the political balance of power has shifted and new governors have taken office. For example, new California Governor Gavin Newsom (D) has indicated that he hopes to reform his state’s tax system, and new Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker (D) proposed during his campaign to pursue a change to the Illinois constitution to replace the state’s flat tax and provide a graduated income tax.

Impact of the ‘Wayfair’ decision

In June 2018, the US Supreme Court in *South Dakota v. Wayfair* overturned its 1967 decision in *National Bellas Hess v. Illinois*, and its 1992 decision in *Quill v. North Dakota*, rejecting the

long-standing physical presence standard for a state to require sellers to register and collect sales tax. States were given the authority to require remote sellers with only an economic presence to register and collect sales tax.

At issue following the *Wayfair* decision is how states would implement their new authority. Would the South Dakota standards (\$100,000 in sales or 200 separate transactions annually, no retroactive application, and simplified compliance features)—which were found ‘clearly sufficient’ by the Supreme Court—serve as the appropriate standard for all states, including those with metro areas whose population far exceeds that of South Dakota?

While a number of states in 2018 quickly adopted the South Dakota standards, others began to consider alternative nexus standards that might increase revenue collection while minimizing possible legal challenges to collection requirements. These considerations also may include enacting income tax factor presence standards or other broad income tax nexus rules. States also may consider challenging historic income tax filing positions as a result of the *Wayfair* decision.

In addition, while not addressed in the Court’s opinion, states began to look at expanding their collection requirements to include marketplace facilitators—marketplaces that facilitate sales of third-party vendors. Of immediate concern is how states will define a marketplace facilitator. The Multistate Tax Commission worked with interested parties to create suggested uniform rules, issuing a white paper that reflects disagreement among the states as to how to define a marketplace facilitator.

Determining appropriate nexus standards and addressing marketplace facilitator collection requirements will be key issues for states this year.





What this means for your business



The results of the 2018 midterm elections and return of divided government will have a dramatic impact on the direction of tax legislation over the next two years. The prospects for significant tax legislation in the new 116th Congress are expected to be limited, given the partisan nature of the 2017 tax reform act and with both parties seeking to position themselves to compete in 2020 for control of the White House and Congress.

Still, there is the potential for agreements to be reached on select tax proposals, including technical corrections or other limited changes to the 2017 act. President Trump and Congress also may find ways to work together to address the need for infrastructure improvements, IRS reforms, and promoting retirement savings.

Rising federal budget deficits may return as a factor in consideration of any significant tax legislation and other issues, including annual appropriation bills for defense and non-defense programs and proposals to address the long-term sustainability of federal programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. The continued involvement of business leaders is critical to guide actions to reduce deficits in a responsible and equitable manner that promotes economic growth.

With the volume and pace of legislative and regulatory activity expected to occur during 2019, it will be essential to remain focused on current developments in order to accurately and timely evaluate the impact on financial reporting. Whether it be further legislative developments in response to the 2017 Act, changes in global tax laws, or additional standard-setting developments, accounting for income taxes will continue to be a focal point for many companies.

While revenue-raising business tax reform provisions with delayed effective dates (in 2022 and thereafter) may not be addressed during the current Congress, stakeholders may want to communicate with policymakers well in advance of such provisions taking effect regarding their impact on business operations and investment decisions.

President Trump's 'America first' trade agenda has been a central focus of his administration's economic policies, with a goal of rebalancing America's global trading relationships to favor the United States. Trade issues, however, have increased uncertainty for businesses that operate globally, especially in terms of potential impact on business investment, supply chain management, and identification of growth opportunities. Business leaders will want to remain involved in the ongoing debate over how best to resolve global trade disputes.

At the same time, there are concerns that global trade disputes and uncertainties such as the United Kingdom's 'Brexit' departure from the European Union are creating headwinds that could serve to threaten continued economic growth both in the United States and around the world. Adding to these uncertainties are efforts by the EU and its member countries to implement measures such as the taxation of digital activities in ways that may result in double taxation, as well as ongoing State aid investigations by the European Commission.

Business leaders will want to remain involved in the ongoing debate over how best to resolve tax policy differences and global trade disputes.



Appendices

Appendix A: Tax Policymakers

Congressional leadership in the 116th Congress

House Leadership	
Speaker of the House	Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)
Majority Leader	Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD)
Majority Whip	James E. Clyburn (D-SC)
Assistant Democratic Leader	Ben Ray Lujan (D-NM)
Democratic Caucus Chair	Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY)
Democratic Caucus Vice Chair	Katherine M. Clark (D-MA)
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chair	Cheri Bustos (D-IL)
Minority Leader	Kevin McCarthy (R-CA)
Minority Whip	Steve Scalise (R-LA)
Republican Conference Chair	Liz Cheney (R-WY)
Republican Conference Vice Chair	Mark Walker (R-NC)
Republican Policy Committee Chair	Gary Palmer (R-AL)
National Republican Congressional Committee	Tom Emmer (R-MN)
Senate Leadership	
President of the Senate	Vice President Mike Pence (R)
President Pro Tempore	Charles Grassley (R-IA)
Majority Leader	Mitch McConnell (R-KY)
Majority Whip	John Thune (R-SD)
Republican Conference Chair	John Barrasso (R-WY)
Republican Conference Vice Chair	Joni Ernst (R-IA)
Republican Policy Committee Chair	Roy Blunt (R-MO)
Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee Chair	Todd Young (R-IN)
Minority Leader and Democratic Conference Chair	Charles E. Schumer (D-NY)
Minority Whip	Richard J. Durbin (D-IL)
Assistant Minority Leader	Patty Murray (D-WA)
Democratic Policy and Communications Chair	Debbie Stabenow (D-MI)
Democratic Policy and Communications Vice-Chair	Joe Manchin, III (D-WV)
Democratic Conference Vice-Chairs	Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Mark Warner (D-VA)
Democratic Conference Secretary	Tammy Baldwin (D-WI)
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee Chair	Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV)
Democratic Steering Committee Chair	Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)
Democratic Outreach Committee Chair	Bernie Sanders (I-VT)

House and Senate tax-writing committees

House Ways and Means Committee

The Ways and Means Committee membership is composed of 25 Democrats and 17 Republicans.

Democrats	Republicans
Richard Neal (D-MA), Chairman	Kevin Brady (R-TX), Ranking Minority Member
John Lewis (D-GA)	Devin Nunes (R-CA)
Lloyd Doggett (D-TX)	Vern Buchanan (R-FL)
Mike Thompson (D-CA)	Adrian Smith (R-NE)
John Larson (D-CT)	Kenny Marchant (R-TX)
Earl Blumenauer (D-OR)	Tom Reed (R-NY)
Ron Kind (D-WI)	Mike Kelly (R-PA)
Bill Pascrell Jr. (D-NJ)	George Holding (R-NC)
Danny Davis (D-IL)	Jason Smith (R-MO)
Linda Sanchez (D-CA)	Tom Rice (R-SC)
Brian Higgins (D-NY)	David Schweikert (R-AZ)
Terri Sewell (D-AL)	Jackie Walorski (R-IN)
Suzan DelBene (D-WA)	Darin LaHood (R-IL)
Judy Chu (D-CA)	Brad Wenstrup (R-OH)
<i>Gwen Moore (D-WI)</i>	<i>Jodey Arrington (R-TX)</i>
<i>Dan Kildee (D-MI)</i>	<i>Drew Ferguson (R-GA)</i>
<i>Brendan Boyle (D-PA)</i>	<i>Ron Estes (R-KS)</i>
<i>Don Beyer (D-VA)</i>	
<i>Dwight Evans (D-PA)</i>	
<i>Brad Schneider (D-IL)</i>	
<i>Tom Suozzi (D-NY)</i>	
<i>Jimmy Panetta (D-CA)</i>	
<i>Stephanie Murphy (D-FL)</i>	
<i>Steven Horsford (D-NV)</i>	
<i>Jimmy Gomez (D-CA)</i>	

* New member in *italics*

Senate Finance Committee

The Finance Committee membership is composed of 15 Republicans and 13 Democrats.

Republicans	Democrats
Charles Grassley (R-IA), Chairman	Ron Wyden (D-OR), Ranking Minority Member
Mike Crapo (R-ID)	Debbie Stabenow (D-MI)
Pat Roberts (R-KS)*	Maria Cantwell (D-WA)
Michael Enzi (R-WY)	Robert Menendez (D-NJ)
John Cornyn (R-TX)	Thomas Carper (D-DE)
John Thune (R-SD)	Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)
Richard Burr (R-NC)	Sherrod Brown (D-OH)
Johnny Isakson (R-GA)	Michael Bennet (D-CO)
Rob Portman (R-OH)	Robert Casey, Jr. (D-PA)
Patrick J. Toomey (R-PA)	Mark Warner (D-VA)
Tim Scott (R-SC)	Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)
Bill Cassidy (R-LA)	<i>Maggie Hassan (D-NH)</i>
<i>James Lankford (R-OK)</i>	<i>Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV)</i>
Steve Daines (R-MT)	
<i>Todd Young (R-IN)</i>	

Senators subject to re-election in 2020 in **bold** / New members in *italics*

* Not running for re-election

Key Treasury and other Administration officials (current and designated)

Treasury Secretary	Steven Mnuchin
Director, National Economic Council	Larry Kudlow
Director, Office of Management and Budget	Mick Mulvaney*
Chair, Council of Economic Advisers	Kevin Hassett
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy	David Kautter
IRS Commissioner	Charles Rettig
IRS Chief Counsel	Michael Desmond**

* Mr. Mulvaney is also serving as Acting White House Chief of Staff

** Mr. Desmond was nominated but not yet confirmed prior to the end of the prior Congress, so his nomination will need to be re-submitted to the Senate.

Appendix B: Senators up for election in 2020

Republicans	Democrats
Alexander, Lamar (R-TN)*	Booker, Cory (D-NJ)
Capito, Shelley Moore (R-WV)	Coons, Chris (D-DE)
Cassidy, Bill (R-LA)	Durbin, Richard J. (D-IL)
Collins, Susan (R-ME)	Jones, Doug (D-AL)
Cornyn, John (R-TX)	Markey, Edward J. (D-MA)
Cotton, Tom (R-AR)	Merkley, Jeff (D-OR)
Daines, Steve (R-MT)	Peters, Gary (D-MI)
Enzi, Michael B. (R-WY)	Reed, Jack (D-RI)
Ernst, Joni (R-IA)	Shaheen, Jeanne (D-NH)
Gardner, Cory (R-CO)	Udall, Tom (D-NM)
Graham, Lindsey (R-SC)	Warner, Mark (D-VA)
Hyde-Smith, Cindy (R-MS)	
Inhofe, James M. (R-OK)	
McConnell, Mitch (R-KY)	
McSally, Martha (R-AZ)	
Perdue, David (R-GA)	
Risch, Jim (R-ID)	
Roberts, Pat (R-KS)*	
Rounds, Michael (R-SD)	
Sasse, Ben (R-NE)	
Sullivan, Dan (R-AK)	
Tillis, Thom (R-NC)	

Senate Finance Committee members shown in **bold italics**

* Not running for re-election

Appendix C: Select Treasury/IRS tax guidance projects

Key Provisions	Release Date
Domestic	
Guidance under Section 168(k) bonus depreciation	August 3, 2018
Guidance adopting new small business accounting method changes under Sections 263A, 448, 460, and 471	August 3, 2018
Guidance under Section 199A (computational)	August 8, 2018
Computational, definitional, and other guidance under Section 163(j)	August 8, 2018
Guidance under Section 162(m) regarding the limitation on excessive employee remuneration	August 21, 2018
Guidance under Section 170 governing availability of the charitable contribution deduction with state or local credits	August 27, 2018
Definitional and other guidance under Section 451(b) and (c)	September 27, 2018
Notice under Section 274 concerning expenses for certain business meals	October 3, 2018
Guidance regarding Opportunity Zones under Sections 1400Z-1 and 1400Z-2	October 19, 2018
Guidance related to church plans	October 22, 2018
Guidance regarding business interest limitation under Section 163(j)	November 26, 2018
Notice 2018-99 under Section 274 concerning qualified transportation fringe benefits including Section 512(a)(7)	December 10, 2018
Guidance under Section 4960 on exempt organization excess compensation	January 1, 2019
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 - Partnership Audit Regulations	TBD
Guidance on qualified equity grants under new Section 83(i)	TBD
Revenue procedures under Sections 168(g) and 179 depreciation	TBD
Guidance under Section 199A anti-abuse and definition	TBD
Guidance on application of Sections 355 and 361 to a distributing corporation's use of controlled stock	TBD
Guidance under Section 355(b) regarding active trade or business	TBD
Guidance under Section 1371(f) on treatment of earnings and profits when an S corp converts to a C corp	TBD
Regulations under Section 1502 and Reg. sec. 1.1502-21(b) on absorption of consolidated NOLs	TBD

Key Provisions	Release Date
International	
Final inversion regulations under Sections 7874, 367, 956, 7701(l), and 304	July 12, 2018
Guidance relating to Section 965 transition tax	August 1, 2018
Proposed regulations on computational, definitional, and anti-avoidance guidance under Sections 199A and 643(f)	August 8, 2018
Regulations under Section 951 regarding the inclusion of global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI)	September 13, 2018
Regulations addressing application of Section 956 to certain shareholders	October 31, 2018
Foreign tax credit guidance under new tax law	November 28, 2018
Rules regarding base erosion and anti-avoidance tax (BEAT) under Section 59A	December 13, 2018
Notice 2019-01 addressing forthcoming guidance on previously taxed earnings and profits under Subpart F	December 14, 2018
Rules regarding anti-hybrid transactions under Section 267A	December 20, 2018
Regulations under Sections 864(c) and 1446 on treatment of foreign gain/loss from sale of US partnerships	December 20, 2018
Regulations concerning participation exemption system for foreign source income under Sections 245A, 1248(j), 1248(k), and 91	TBD
Section 250 regulations on deductions for foreign derived intangible income (FDII) and GILTI	TBD
Regulations addressing the changes to Sections 367(d) and 482	TBD
Final regulations under Section 482 on treatment and allocation of risk	TBD
Regulations related to modifications of Sections 951(b) and 958(b)	TBD
Guidance under Sections 959 and 961 concerning the definition of previously taxed earnings and profits under Subpart F	TBD

Note: Release dates generally are different than the date when guidance is published in the Federal Register. Due dates for public comments are based upon publication in the Federal Register. <https://www.federalregister.gov/>

Appendix D: Tax accounting issues related to tax laws and regulations

Accounting for income taxes is complex. The overall model has been in place for many years with little change while tax laws and policies have seen pervasive change. Companies continually have had to update their financial statement processes and controls to navigate these uncharted territories. Although accounting for the initial effects of US tax reform is complete for many companies, the expectation of future legislative and regulatory developments in response to tax reform will require companies to remain focused on the changing landscape and the resulting financial statement effect.

Perhaps the most significant complexity that will continue to affect financial reporting is how to address uncertainties that have emerged regarding how to apply the new law. In some cases the statute appears clear, but the result of applying the statutory language seems inconsistent with apparent legislative intent. In other cases, it is simply unclear how to apply a new provision.

While it is expected that many of these issues will be corrected or clarified through either final regulatory guidance or legislative action, most guidance to date has been in proposed form. Companies have questioned how the effect of proposed regulations should be considered in their financial statements.

Under the income tax accounting standard, companies must account for tax laws when and as enacted, and, therefore, cannot consider any anticipated changes in tax law or expected future interpretations. In order to recognize the tax benefits associated with any tax position, it first must be concluded that it is more likely than not that the position will be sustained based on the technical merits. Generally, as future developments further refine the application of law impacting a tax position, the effects are recorded in the financial statements in the period such guidance is issued.

Said another way, the assessment of an uncertain tax position is a continuous process, which does not end with the initial determination of a position's sustainability. As of each balance sheet date, companies should reassess unresolved uncertain positions to determine whether the factors underlying the sustainability assertion have changed (e.g., identification of new information) and whether the amount of the recognized tax benefit is still appropriate.

While proposed regulations do not carry the weight of final regulations, they provide guidance with respect to the Treasury's interpretation of the law. In evaluating whether a tax position meets the recognition criteria of the standard, all sources of tax authority should be considered. As part of this evaluation, it is important to determine whether the company intends (and is able) to follow the proposed regulations. The income tax accounting standard requires that changes in the expected outcome of an uncertain tax position be based on new information, and not on a mere re-evaluation of existing information. Accordingly, once a company has considered proposed regulations in its assessment, it is not expected that this outcome would change until there is new information (e.g., final regulations).

In addition to expected legislative changes, accounting standards continue to evolve and often have impacts on tax accounting. Whether changes involve revenue recognition, leasing, or the developments around financial instruments, all have the potential to impact the tax provision and should be closely monitored. An exposure draft is expected in the first quarter of calendar 2019 addressing income tax accounting disclosures. In 2016, the FASB issued a proposed Accounting Standard Update (ASU) that introduced significant changes to current disclosure requirements for income taxes, adding new disclosures and modifying or eliminating some existing ones.

As the prospects for enactment of comprehensive tax reform improved shortly after the ASU's release, the FASB put the project on hold, driven in part by the need to evaluate how US tax reform also may impact income tax related disclosures. In late 2018, the FASB Board re-deliberated the exposure draft and proposed changes in a number of areas, including indefinite reinvestment assertions, uncertain tax positions, valuation allowances, and the effective tax rate reconciliation.

Appendix E: Expired or expiring tax provisions

Provisions expired before 2018
Credit for certain nonbusiness energy property
Credit for residential energy property
Credit for qualified fuel cell motor vehicles
Credit for alternative fuel vehicle refueling property
Credit for two-wheeled plug-in electric vehicles
Second generation biofuel producer credit
Incentives for biodiesel and renewable diesel: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Income tax credits for biodiesel fuel, biodiesel used to produce a qualified mixture, and small agri-biodiesel producers Income tax credits for renewable diesel fuel and renewable diesel used to produce a qualified mixture Excise tax credits and outlay payments for biodiesel fuel mixtures Excise tax credits and outlay payments for renewable diesel fuel mixtures
Beginning-of-construction date for non-wind renewable power facilities eligible to claim the electricity production credit or investment credit in lieu of the production credit
Credit for production of Indian coal
Indian employment credit
Railroad track maintenance credit
Credit for construction of new energy efficient homes
Mine rescue team training credit
Credit for hybrid solar lighting system property
Credit for geothermal heat pump property, small wind property, and combined heat and power property
Credit for qualified fuel cell and stationary microturbine power plant property
Discharge of indebtedness on principal residence excluded from gross income of individuals
Premiums for mortgage insurance deductible as interest that is qualified residence interest
Three-year depreciation for race horses two years old or younger
Five-year cost recovery for certain energy property
Seven-year recovery period for motorsports entertainment complexes
Accelerated depreciation for business property on an Indian reservation
Special depreciation allowance for second generation biofuel plant property
Energy efficient commercial buildings deduction
Election to expense advanced mine safety equipment
Special expensing rules for certain film, television, and live theatrical productions
Deduction allowable with respect to income attributable to domestic production activities in Puerto Rico
Deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses
Special rule for sales or dispositions to implement Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or State electric restructuring policy
Special rate for qualified timber gains
Empowerment zone tax incentives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Designation of an empowerment zone and of additional empowerment zones Empowerment zone tax-exempt bonds Empowerment zone employment credit Increased expensing under Section 179 Nonrecognition of gain on rollover of empowerment zone investments

Incentives for alternative fuel and alternative fuel mixtures: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Excise tax credits and outlay payments for alternative fuel Excise tax credits for alternative fuel mixtures
Temporary increase in limit on cover-over of rum excise tax revenues (from \$10.50 to \$13.25 per proof gallon) to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
American Samoa economic development credit
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund financing rate
Provisions expired in 2018
Medical expense deduction: adjusted gross income (AGI) floor 7.5%
Black Lung Disability Trust Fund: increase in amount of excise tax on coal
Provisions expiring in 2019
Specified health insurance policy fee
Self-insured health plan fee
Credit for health insurance costs of eligible individuals
New markets tax credit
Employer credit for paid family and medical leave
Work opportunity credit
Beginning-of-construction date for wind renewable power facilities eligible to claim the electricity production credit or investment credit in lieu of the production credit
Look-through treatment of payments between related controlled foreign corporations under the foreign personal holding company rules
Provisions modifying the rates of taxation of beer, wine and distilled spirits, and certain other rules
Provisions expiring in 2020
Placed-in-service date for eligibility for the credit for production from certified advanced nuclear power facilities
Provisions expiring in 2021
Surtax on fuel used in aircraft in a fractional ownership program
Credit for individuals for residential solar property
Beginning-of-construction date for increased credit for business solar energy property
Provisions expiring in 2022
Highway Trust Fund excise tax rates: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> All but 4.3 cents-per-gallon of the taxes on highway gasoline, diesel fuel, kerosene, and alternative fuels Reduced rate of tax on partially exempt methanol or ethanol fuel Tax on retail sale of heavy highway vehicles Tax on heavy truck tires
Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund financing rate
Provisions expiring in 2023
Highway Trust Fund excise tax rates: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual use tax on heavy highway vehicles
Provisions expiring in 2025
Modification of individual income tax rates and special rules for unearned income of children
Child tax credit: Increased credit amount, increased refundable amount, reduced earned income threshold, modification of identification requirements
Increase in exemption amount and phaseout threshold of individual AMT
Increase in standard deduction of individuals

Suspension of miscellaneous itemized deduction
Suspension of limitation on itemized deductions
Tax exemption for student loan discharges on account of death or disability
Treatment of certain individuals performing services in the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt
Suspension of exclusion for reimbursement of bicycle commuting
Suspension of exclusion for moving expense reimbursement
Suspension of deduction for personal exemptions
Limitation on deduction for qualified residence interest, suspension of deduction for home equity interest
Limitation on deduction for State, local, etc., taxes
Personal casualty losses limited to Federally declared disaster areas
Modification of rules relating to computation of wagering losses
Increased percentage limitation on cash contributions to public charities
Qualified business income deduction
Suspension of deduction for moving expenses
Deductibility of employer de minimis meals and related eating facility, and meals for the convenience of the employer
Transfer of excess pension assets to retiree health and life insurance accounts
Limitation on excess business losses of noncorporate taxpayers
ABLE accounts: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contributions eligible for saver's credit • Rollovers from qualified tuition programs permitted • Increased contributions limit
Increase in estate and gift tax exemption
Provisions expiring in 2026
Additional first-year depreciation with respect to qualified property
Election of additional depreciation for certain plants bearing fruits and nuts
Provisions expiring in 2027
Expensing of certain costs of replanting citrus plants lost by reason of casualty

Source: JCT staff report on expiring federal tax provisions 2016-2027 (JCX-1-18)

Note: The JCT staff report does not include 2017 tax reform act business provisions that are subject to automatic modifications with delayed effective dates.

Appendix F: Select Congressional Budget Office revenue options for deficit reduction

Provision	Revenue estimate over 10 years (\$ billions)
Individual	
Increase individual income tax rates on ordinary income by 1 percentage point	905.4
Increase individual income tax rates in the four highest brackets by 1 percentage point	222.9
Increase individual income tax rates in the two highest brackets by 1 percentage point	123.4
Increase rates on long-term capital gains and dividends by 2 percentage points	69.6
Align top two brackets on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends to match the third and sixth brackets applicable to ordinary income	75.9
Align top two brackets on long-term capital gains and qualified dividends to match the third and fifth brackets applicable to ordinary income	81.4
Eliminate head-of-household filing status	165.3
Limit head-of-household filing status to unmarried people with a qualifying child under 17	66.2
Limit deductibility to charitable contributions in excess of 2% of adjusted gross income	175.6
Limit deductibility of charitable donations to cash contributions	145.7
Eliminate itemized deductions	1,312.0
Change the tax treatment of capital gains from sales of inherited assets	104.9
Eliminate the tax exemption for new qualified private activity bonds	31.8
Expand the base of the net investment income tax to include the income of active participants in S corporations and limited partnerships	198.9
Tax carried interest as ordinary income	14.0
Include all disability payments in taxable income	92.7
Include disability payments in taxable income only for veterans with a disability rating of 20% or less	4.4
Include employer-paid premiums for income replacement insurance in employees' taxable income	341.9
Further limit annual contributions to retirement plans	103.3
Tax social security and railroad retirement benefits in the same way that distributions from defined benefit plans are taxed	410.5

Eliminate certain tax preferences for educational expenses (including the American Opportunity and Lifetime Learning tax credits and phase-out of the deductibility of student loan interest)	187.6
Lower the investment income limit for the earned income tax credit and extend that limit to the refundable portion of the child tax credit	8.2
Require earned income tax credit and child tax credit claimants to have a social security number that is valid for employment	23.6
Increase payroll tax rate for medicare hospital insurance by 1 percentage point	898.3
Increase payroll tax rate for medicare hospital insurance by 2 percentage points	1,786.5
Increase the payroll tax rate for social security by 1 percentage point	715.5
Increase the payroll tax rate for social security by 2 percentages point	1,422.1
Increase the maximum taxable earnings for the social security payroll tax by raising the taxable share to 90%	785.1*
Increase the maximum taxable earnings for the social security payroll tax by subjecting earnings greater than \$250,000 to payroll tax	1,222.6
Expand social security coverage to include newly hired state and local government employees	80.0
Increase federal civilian employees' contributions to the federal employees retirement system	45.4
Business	
Increase the corporate income tax rate by 1 percentage point	96.3
Replace the excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health plans with a limit on the income and payroll tax exclusions for employment-based health insurance set at the 50th percentile of premiums	638.0*
Replace the excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health plans with a limit on the income and payroll tax exclusions for employment-based health insurance set at the 75th percentile of premiums	256.0*
Replace the excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health plans with a limit on only the income tax exclusion for employment-based health insurance set at the 50th percentile of premiums	438.0*
Tax all pass-through business owners under SECA and impose a material participation standard	163.1
Repeal the expensing of exploration and development costs	2.3
Disallow the use of the percentage depletion allowance	6.1
Repeal the LIFO and lower of cost or market inventory accounting methods	57.9
Require half of advertising expenses to be amortized over 5 years	62.5
Require half of advertising expenses to be amortized over 10 years	132.4
Repeal the low-income housing tax credit	49.4
Increase appropriations for IRS enforcement initiatives	35.3*

Financial Services	
Impose a fee on large financial institutions with assets of \$50 billion or more	103.1
Impose a fee on large financial institutions with assets of \$250 billion or more	90.0
Impose a tax on financial transactions	776.7
Tax gains from derivatives as ordinary income on a mark-to-market basis	18.7
Other	
Increase taxes that finance the federal share of the unemployment insurance system	18.1
Increase all taxes on alcoholic beverages to \$16 per proof gallon	68.4
Increase all taxes on alcoholic beverages to \$16 per proof gallon and index for inflation	82.5
Increase the excise tax on tobacco products by 50%	41.9*
Increase excise taxes on motor fuels and index for inflation (15-cent increase)	237.1
Increase excise taxes on motor fuels and index for inflation (35-cent increase)	514.9
Impose an excise tax on overland freight transport	358.3
Impose a 5% value-added tax to a broad base	2,970.0
Phase in a 5% value-added tax to apply to the same broad base	2,330.0
Impose a 5% value-added tax to a narrow base	1,920.0
Impose a tax on emissions of greenhouse gases	1,099.0

* Net estimated revenue effects after adjusting for associated federal outlays

Source: CBO, *Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2019 to 2028*.

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